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Technology and Formation: Stiegler on Event and Self-Care
Gert-Jan van der Heiden 
Abstract: This essay critically examines how Bernard Stiegler addresses the 
question of present-day technological developments and how they affect our 
understanding of education and self-formation. The first section is devoted to 
an account of the basics of Stiegler’s understanding of the relationship between 
technology and humanity as well as of his characterization of the specific 
problems that characterize technology today. The main part of the essay analyzes 
how the questions of self-care, self-formation and education are addressed in 
relation to these specific problems. Stiegler addresses these problems in terms 
of the Derridean vocabulary of the pharmakon, and accounts for the present-day 
technological inventions in terms of pharmacological events. It is shown that 
Stiegler’s account of education is difficult to combine with his attention to the 
pharmakon as well as to the event. In the concluding section, it is suggested that 
the question of self-formation in relation to pharmacological events should be 
reinterpreted in terms of the concept of experience.
Keywords: Bernard Stiegler, technology, care of the self, formation, pharmacology.
Technology and Formation: Stiegler on Event and Self-Care
The question of self-care has been reintroduced in philosophy by the 
works Pierre Hadot (1995) and (the later) Michel Foucault (e.g., 2005) 
who analyze self-care in ancient philosophy. More specifically, Foucault 
is interested in the ancient philosophical practices of self-formation, which 
he describes as technologies that 
permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help 
of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies 
and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality (1997, 225; my italics). 
The idea of self-formation or –transformation as a technology has captured 
the attention of Bernard Stiegler in his recent works (e.g., 2010 & 2013). He 
connects this theme to his more encompassing concerns the importance
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and impact of technology on humankind and society in general and on the 
contemporary world in particular. For him, self-formation may offer a way 
of dealing with the particular problematic dimensions of technology for 
society today. In this essay, I will examine first Stiegler’s understanding 
of the relation of technology and humankind as well as of the specific 
problems inherent in technology today. Subsequently, I will analyze 
and criticize his conception of self-care, self-formation and education 
as a response to these problems. In particular, I will critically assess his 
account of education in relation to his interpretation of technics in terms 
of the pharmakon and of present-day technological inventions in terms of 
pharmacological events. In my conclusion I will offer some other, more 
fruitful directions for the inquiry of self-formation in relation to the event. 
  
1. Technology and the Birth of Humankind
Stiegler (1998, 183-203) uses Plato’s myth on the genesis of humankind 
as narrated in the Protagoras (320d-322d; Cooper, 1997, 756-758) to 
characterize his account of the relation of technology and humankind. In 
the contemporary setting, the question of the human is often taken up in 
terms of the question of the end of the human as well as of humanism, 
and these ends are often thought in terms of consequences and the future 
of technology, such as in the ideas of trans-humanism or post-humanism. 
In the context of these questions, Stiegler argues that before addressing 
the end of humankind, one should first understand how technics and 
technology are intrinsic to the human and even precede its birth (1998, 
135). In Plato’s myth, humankind is understood as a supplementary or 
prosthetic being, as Stiegler notes (1998, 193).1 According to the story, 
the gods, having shaped all mortal beings, assign a task to the two titans 
Prometheus and Epimetheus, namely the task to hand out to each species 
the proper capacity (dunamis) it needs for its survival. Epimetheus adopts 
this task and hands out capacities to all species except one. Turning to 
humankind, he finds he has no capacities left, leaving the human utterly 
vulnerable: “the human race was naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed” 
(321c; Cooper, 1997, 757). In the urgency of the moment, Prometheus 
decides to steal the art of fire from Hephaistos and the other arts (technai) 
from Athena in order to compensate for this lack of human capacities so 
1  Clearly, Stiegler does not only offer a mythical account, but substantiates the meaning of this  
   mythical account for the genesis of humankind by many arguments and authors. Yet, for sake 
   of clarity and readability, I limit myself here, as Protagoras who tells this story in the dialogue, 
   to the story. 
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that humankind has a chance to survive. In Stiegler’s reading, this story 
discloses a number of fundamental insights concerning the relation 
between humankind and technology. 
(1) The non-proper, non-natural human. First, humankind does not 
have properly human capacities or powers; rather, the powers it has at its 
disposal do not naturally belong its species (according to the myth, they 
belong to the gods). The human only has powers and skills thanks to the 
gift of the technai. In particular, this applies to the logos by which the human 
is usually defined as zoon logon echon: humans have logos in distinction to 
other mortal beings that are called the aloga (Cooper, 1997, 757), but this 
capacity is made possible by the technai which are a supplement and a 
prosthesis for the human. 
(2) Supplement and pharmakon. Secondly, this account of technics and 
technology as supplement should be understood in line with the work 
of Derrida, who was Stiegler’s main teacher. The birth of humankind is 
marked by the instauration of an original différance between the human’s 
incompleteness at birth and the technai that supplement this incompleteness: 
since the technai are not properly human, they compensate for the original 
human lack (défaut) without completing it. More precisely, in line with 
Derrida’s account, the supplement should be understood as both the 
condition of both possibility and impossibility: human existence is made 
possible by the technical supplement since this supplement grants the 
capacities for survival. Yet, the same supplement threatens this existence. 
First, because it is not properly or naturally human and thus changes 
what it is to be human – and the history of humankind is a history in 
which technology changes who humans are. Second, concretely, the very 
gifts making human existence possible may also destroy it. Prometheus’ 
gift of fire is exemplary in this sense, as Stiegler notes: fire is not only the 
condition of possibility of human civilization, but also what may destroy 
this civilization by setting it on fire (2013, 24).2 
This latter example of the gift of fire inspires Stiegler in his later 
works (e.g., 2013) to adopt an other important figure from Derrida’s work, 
namely the figure of the pharmakon that Derrida develops to characterize 
writing as both remedy and poison (1981, 61-172): like writing, which is 
also a techne, the technai are a remedy for human incompleteness, but they 
may turn out to be the poison that will be the end of human existence. 
2   This is an explicit theme in Plato’s myth and the reason why Zeus, after the theft of Prometheus, 
   assigns Hermes with the task to offer the divine techne politike to the humans. This is also an 
   important theme for Stiegler (1998, 183-203), but I will not discuss this here. 
Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 2015 / 3
54
This ambiguity of technics for humankind marks the human relation to 
technology, and we will see in which sense Stiegler will claim that it is 
the poisonous side that seems to take over in present-day technological 
developments and thus indeed making us face the question of the end of
the human. Yet, before turning to this element of his analysis, we first need 
to discuss one more insight drawn from the myth. 
(3) Appropriation and deferral. Third, because technics is an 
indispensable supplement that does not come natural to humans, humans 
are confronted with the necessity to appropriate these technics: the human 
capacities are not given by birth, but need to be taught to children. The 
child does not speak when it is born, and the child has no natural entrance 
to the culture in which it is born; the child only enters language and culture 
with a delay, with a temporal deferral. Stiegler’s significant elaboration of 
this temporal deferral (see, e.g., 1998, 246ff; 2009, 226) should once more be 
seen in line with Derrida’s work and more specifically with his account of 
différance as deferral (see, e.g., 1982, 3-27). For Stiegler, this deferral means 
that the non-identity of the human with its (linguistic, cultural, and so on) 
capacities implies a delay, which is the time need for the human to acquire 
these capacities. 
In the next section, I will elaborate this aspect of deferral in relation to 
Stiegler’s understanding of tradition and education. Yet, to get a sense for 
the scope of problems and questions to which this account of appropriation 
and deferral leads, let me first discuss an example in a way that remains 
close to Stiegler’s account, but also indicates the problems that surpass 
Stiegler’s framework. The example concerns language.
The human child is an infant, i.e., one whom cannot speak (in-fans). 
The child is thus marked by the lack of the capacity to speak if by that 
we mean the capacity of someone who can already speak a particular 
language. Yet, at the same time, the infant has an almost excessive capacity 
to speak.3 “Infants,” as Heller-Roazen suggests following Jakobson, “as 
far as articulation is concerned … are capable of everything. Without 
the slightest effort they can produce any – and all – sounds contained 
in human language” (2005, 9-10). Yet, the actualization of this capacity – 
“they can produce” – takes on a particular form: children are not born into 
all human languages, but are rather educated into one or more of them. 
Hence, the child’s potentiality to speak all languages is actualized only in 
the speaking of one or several of them. 
3 Already Aristotle distinguishes these two forms of dunamis in his De Anima (417a22-417b1; 
  Barnes, 1984, 664). See also Agamben’s account of potentiality (1999, 179).
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The child’s lack of actually speaking a language is thus not a 
pure nothingness. In this sense, “lack” is not the appropriate term. 
As Stiegler notes, the défaut of the human should be understood as a 
desire, as a propensity (to speak, in this case). However, the Heller-
Roazen’s comment also marks something that is not fully present in the 
register of Stiegler’s thought: for him, the défaut, the particular desire 
of the human, is generated by or in the encounter with the techne, i.e., 
the language in which the child is to be educated. In a certain sense 
this is true: the child only starts to speak when spoken to. Yet, the 
potentiality of the infant to speak also exceeds the actual languages to 
which it is exposed and into which it is educated. The lack of the child 
corresponds to this generic potentiality as well as to the need of education. 
The need of education to get into a language (as well as into culture) 
has important implications. Lyotard, e.g., describes this in the following 
striking way: “That children have to be educated is a circumstance which 
only proceeds from the fact that they are not completely led by nature, 
not programmed. The institutions which constitute culture supplement 
this native lack” (1991, 3). As Stiegler, Lyotard notes that the original 
human incompleteness (défaut) is indeed a “native lack” in the sense that 
infant is not yet equipped with the results of technics and the arts that 
constitute the culture and its accompanying institutions into which the 
infant is educated. Yet, one should immediately add that this description 
of the human défaut as lack of culture is at the same time the human 
surplus that consists in the human’s non-coinciding with its “nature”. In 
a certain sense, as Lyotard maintains, this means that the human does 
not only exist thanks to the arts that are never fully one’s own, but also 
depends on this original surplus with which the child is actually born: 
the potentiality to be educated in each and every language and culture, 
is the child’s in-fancy. This potentiality, which Stiegler somehow touches 
on but which he never discusses as such, does not only support the desire 
to be educated but also necessarily exceeds every historically constituted 
culture or language – and in particular the culture(s) or language(s) that 
the infant will be taught.  
The human’s entrance into language is thus marked by a double 
deferral: on the one hand, the deferral between birth and education and, 
on the other hand, the deferral between the constituted language that is 
handed down from generation to generation, e.g. in the form of writing, 
and the appropriated language by which the individual can speak. It is 
the second deferral, the difference between the sedimentation of tradition 
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by which culture is made possible, to which Stiegler pays attention and 
which we will investigate in the next section; I discuss the implications of 
leaving out the first deferral elsewhere.4 
2. Technology as Tradition and Event
Stiegler discusses the relation between technology and education in 
terms of two different problems. The first problem (2.1.) can be captured in 
terms of Derrida’s concept of writing and its implications for the notion of 
tradition, whereas the second problem (2.2.) concerns the ever-increasing 
speed of technology in the contemporary era that constitute what Stiegler 
calls the pharmacological event. Let me discuss both problems. 
2.1. Tradition and Technology
As Stiegler notes, his work on technology in its temporal constitution 
departs from the insight that a fundamental difference exists between 
Husserl’s emphasis on the lived experience as the basis of phenomenology 
– and thus the privileging of the present – and Heidegger’s emphasis on 
Dasein’s hermeneutic relation to the past which needs to be given a future: 
The issue is no longer that of lived experience but of the future of 
the non-lived past: a “past of Dasein” is already-there before one, but 
it is only one’s past to the degree to which this Dasein has had to 
be, only to the degree to which it is possible that this past, which 
is not yet one’s own, can or could become one’s own. (2009, 4-5)
This quote offers an exact formulation of the problem Stiegler aims 
to deal with: the past mentioned here is not Dasein’s past lived experience 
and is therefore not simply Dasein’s own past; yet, “without this past, 
Dasein is nothing,” because the past – e.g., the past of the language and 
the culture in which Dasein finds itself – offers Dasein the orientation 
that it does not have. Therefore everything depends on the question of 
whether Dasein can appropriate this past so that Dasein inherits it as its 
proper inheritance. It is within the Heideggerian, hermeneutic framework 
that Stiegler raises his questions concerning the exact status of the past: 
how is the past given to Dasein and in which senses can it (and can it not) 
be appropriated? In raising these questions, Stiegler brings Derrida’s 
4 See “Technology and Childhood” to be published in the International Yearbook for Hermeneutics 
  (2016). 
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conception of writing to fruition and extends it to a conception of 
(mnemonic) technics in general. As Derrida (1989) has shown in his 
account of Husserl’s text on the origin of geometry, a history of a science 
depends on the externalization of this science in writing and cannot be 
founded on the lived experience of the scientist alone.5 It is writing that 
allows a science to be extended beyond the limits of the consciousness 
of its inventor as well as the living language community in which it 
originated and thus to be handed over to other generations and other 
communities. Writing is an external memory by which we have access 
to what our predecessors thought, that is to say, we have access to this 
tradition if we appropriate the written text. According to Derrida – and 
it is Stiegler who elaborates this by pointing out that writing is a tertiary 
memory (1998, 246ff; 2009, 226), i.e., a memory that does not go back to 
the lived experience of the one who interprets it –this structure of writing 
is the condition of possibility for the problematic of the appropriation 
of the past by Dasein as introduced by Heidegger in Being and Time.6 
If education or formation as the process of the appropriation of 
tradition is fundamental to human existence (since the world in which we 
live becomes meaningful and an inhabitable world thanks to education 
and formation), we see at once how this process of education is made both 
possible and impossible by the structure of writing that constitutes every 
tradition. Tradition is not only the collection of written sediments handed 
down to us but also sedimented texts but also a horizon of meaning that 
offers us the means to interpret and appropriate these texts. Yet, by its 
dependence on these sediments, tradition is constituted by a structure that 
precedes the level of meaning and that cannot be reduced to or identified 
with it: writing is a supplement to the lived experience in Husserl’s sense 
as well as to the appropriation of the past in Heidegger’s sense. Whereas 
meaning belongs to the phenomenological level of lived experience as well 
as to the hermeneutic level of appropriation and understanding, writing 
as the indispensable supplement of these two levels cannot be accounted 
for in terms of meaning alone. Rather, writing is what remains if we would 
suspend the horizon of meaning within which we receive the past and in 
which we are educated. Therefore, writing is the non-identity or différance 
5 This text of Derrida is of fundamental importance to Stiegler, and he discusses it extensively 
  (2009, 33-49).
6 Stiegler extends this problem to technology as a whole, which is our external memory that 
  makes an inheritance, a tradition and a culture possible and without which human beings 
  cannot exist. See, e.g., his account of Leroi-Gourhan who states that the appropriation of 
   tradition “is biologically indispensable to the human species” (as quoted in Stiegler, 1998, 172).
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of the past and the horizon of meaning in which the past is appropriated. 
This has two implications. 
(a) First, a complete appropriation of the past is impossible. Phrased 
in this way, however, also phenomenological and hermeneutical 
approaches agree with this proposition. Yet, for these approaches this 
proposition means that no appropriation can exhaust the horizon of 
meaning in which the past is interpreted: meaning is always presupposed 
and every appropriation takes place in a horizon of meaning. The point 
of view of Derrida and Stiegler, however, is that it is not meaning but 
rather writing that is presupposed, i.e., the horizon of meaning is not all-
embracing, but is itself confronted with a past that has the structure of 
writing, of what is not reducible to meaning, thanks to which it can be 
appropriated within different horizons of meaning. Consequently, every 
appropriation is at the same time an “exappropriation” (Stiegler, 1998, 
159) since every appropriation leaves a remainder, something that resists 
interpretation. Thus, the past is never fully one’s own. Yet, in turn, it is 
this very remainder, writing, that allows for the handing down of the 
same inheritance to other generations; it is the condition of possibility 
for the process of interpretation to continue beyond any given horizon of 
meaning. 
(b) The incompleteness of appropriation has a second implication: 
the différance of the past handed down as writing and the horizon of 
meaning in which it is appropriated, is not only traceable in the limits of 
every interpretation, but it is also the margin or the play that allows for 
something new to announce itself within this horizon of meaning, i.e., the 
margin that allows for an innovation of this horizon of meaning.7 For what 
follows, it is important to understand that such an innovation, as it is rooted 
in what is not (or not yet) of the order of meaning, implies a temporary 
suspension of this horizon of meaning since this innovation appears in the 
first place, as writing or technics, as what cannot be appropriated in the 
present horizon of meaning.8 As non-appropriable, the innovation asks 
for a renewal of this horizon of meaning so that appropriation becomes 
possible. Thus, on the level of tradition and its horizon of meaning, the 
same happens as what happens in relation to Dasein and its inheritance 
7 An account of tradition as a play between sedimentation and innovation can also be found 
  in the work of Ricoeur (1984, 68), yet in his oeuvre also the innovation is understood as the 
  invention of new meaning as has basic examples, living metaphor and new narratives, clearly 
  indicate. 
8 These are basic insights also elaborated in contemporary forms of the hermeneutics of the 
  event, see, e.g., Romano’s work (1999).
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of the past: since the past is not always already appropriated, but needs to 
be appropriated and applied to Dasein’s own existence, the appropriation 
of the past is marked by a temporal deferral from which a fundament 
expropriation may take place (Stiegler, 2009, 184) which has a fundament 
disorienting effect. According to Stiegler, this temporal deferral, its 
accompanying expropriation and disorientation are intensified in the 
present-day forms of technology that constitute proper innovations. 
This brings us to the second set of problems concerning the relation of 
technology and education. 
2.2. Event, Education, and Technology 
According to Stiegler (2009, 3), the speed of technological innovation has 
accelerated so much in our time, that the multiplication of temporal deferrals 
by which it is accompanied, interrupts the very process of appropriation: 
our society is no longer capable of reconstituting the horizon of meaning 
in which the past can be interpreted. Consequently, since our past offers 
orientation for our lives, actions and thoughts, “we are suffering from 
disorientation as such” (2009, 3).9 Thus, this intensification has a particular 
consequence: by its accelerated speed, technology manifests itself first 
and foremost by its poisonous side, destroying the horizon of meaning, 
interrupting education as well as the process of self-formation. Stiegler 
explains this impossibility of education in the following terms:
We have seen that, generally, a new pharmacological event 
produces a primary suspension that disorients psychosocial 
individuation by short-circuiting long-established organological 
programmes, which are thus suspended by this techno-logical 
epokhe. What Being and Time called “the understanding that [Dasein] 
has of its being” is thus challenged by the pharmakon. (2013, 119)
Stiegler refers here to the event, which is the concept used in contemporary 
philosophy to think a form of innovation that it interrupts and suspends 
the existing orders of understanding (Van der Heiden, 2014). Stiegler’s 
explanation of this notion in the above quote shows that he adopts the 
9 Stiegler continues the above quote as follows: “This leads above all to the speed of technical 
  development since the Industrial Revolution, which has continued to accelerate, dramatically 
  widening the distance between technical systems and social organizations as if, negotiation 
  between them appearing to be impossible, their final divorce seems inevitable.”
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term in a similar sense, albeit in the framework of his own interest 
in technics and technology. The pharmacological event refers to the 
technological inventions that interrupt (“short-circuits”) the common, 
established understandings and the common practices in a society. They 
obstruct Dasein’s appropriation of the past.
It is in this context that Stiegler addresses the question of education. 
He does so by referring to and critically reading Foucault’s account of 
Kant’s famous text What is Enlightenment? in which Kant’s fundamental 
appeal to humans to become mature and have the courage to think for 
themselves is stressed (Foucault, 2010, 303-320). It is this critical capacity 
to think as a form of maturity that intrigues Stiegler since the transitional 
capacity of education – the formation or Bildung that leads humans from 
immaturity to maturity – is thought by Kant in terms of the technology of 
writing: Kant addresses the literate public, the audience that can read and 
write (Stiegler, 2010, 24-28). Transposed to our times, education means for 
Stiegler the process of becoming mature in the face of the expropriating 
and disorienting effects of the pharmacological event. Stressing the 
pharmacological dimension of technics, he notes that the only way to 
appropriate the disorienting technical innovations is by inventing other 
techniques of self-formation that render the subject mature in the face of 
these new technologies.10 
Yet, Stiegler’s attempt to connect his reinterpretation of the pharmakon 
by the pharmacological event to a conception of formation or Bildung (which 
he mentions several times in 2010, 17-35) has important consequences that 
seem to go against the grain of his own line of argumentation. The easiest 
way to capture these consequences is by considering two distinctions 
or oppositions that determine the course of his account of education 
and event: maturity versus immaturity and the implicitly developed 
opposition of disorienting technologies versus reorienting techniques of 
self-formation. My discussion of these two oppositions is meant to show 
the intrinsic difficulty or even impossibility of connecting the Derridean 
idea of pharmakon with the Enlightenment idea of Bildung. 
Let me start with tracing the second opposition. To this end one 
should inquire first into the exact status of the pharmacological event. 
10 As Stiegler (2010, 23-24) points out we already see the pharmacology of writing at work in 
   Kant’s What is Enlightenment?: Kant addresses the literate community, i.e., those who can read 
   and who are formed by writing. In this sense, writing is the very condition of possibility of 
   reaching maturity. Yet, the same writing can also be a threat to maturity and understanding; it 
   “can just as likely suspend the reader in immaturity” and “‘replace understanding’” (24), e.g., 
    when what is written is treated as mere authority rather than as a training or a practice to reach 
   a mature level of understanding.
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An event is an event of innovation. Therefore, the pharmacological event 
is first and foremost poisonous since it makes the appropriation of the 
past and orientation in the new situation by means of the established 
modes of interpretation and the given horizon of meaning impossible. 
In a response to this poisonous side the question of education has to be 
raised again, according to Stiegler, and more specifically the question 
of the invention of techniques that allow us appropriate and reorient 
ourselves in the new situation. This distinction between the technology 
that causes the pharmacological event and the transitional techniques 
helping humans to become mature in relation to this event problematizes 
the very idea of pharmakon. Recall that for Derrida, when introducing 
the concept of pharmakon to reinterpret Plato’s account of writing, his 
concern is not only the distinction between speech (and the living 
experience or presence accompanying it) and writing – the distinction that 
became famous – but rather the distinction Plato makes in the Phaedrus 
between good and bad writing, between fertile and sterile writing (1981, 
149). The notion of pharmakon is brought into play to problematize the 
distinction between good and bad writing. Stiegler’s distinction between 
the pharmacological event and the techniques of self-formation seems to 
reiterate, against the grain of Stiegler’s argument that aims to embrace 
the concept of pharmakon, the distinction between good and bad technics, 
between the invention of a new technology that obstructs understanding 
and the invention of technologies that offer a transition to a new epoch of 
understanding. That this reiteration is an important motive in Stiegler’s 
recent works, can be seen even more clearly in his univocal rejection of 
the programming industries and his concentration on techniques for 
education that are able to counteract the pure poisonous technologies of 
the programming industries (for Stiegler (2010) the advertising campaign 
of the French Channel Y is the very embodiment of evil). In a very precise 
sense, Stiegler thus becomes vulnerable to the critique he directs at Adorno 
and Horkheimer who, according to him, only see the poisonous side of 
technology (Stiegler, 2013, 18). His own account of the technology of the 
programming industries as making humans only stupid and immature 
indicates the very rejection of the ambiguity of the pharmakon with respect 
to this technology.11 
Note that this one-sided rejection of certain forms of technologies 
11 In a very precise sense, Stiegler thus becomes vulnerable for the same critique he directs at 
   Adorno and Horkheimer who, according to him, only see the poisonous side of technology 
   (2013, 18): the technology of the programming industries is making humans only stupid and 
    immature. This “only” is the very rejection of the ambiguity of the pharmakon.
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in the hands of the programming industries, goes hand in hand with a 
certain conception of education, namely as the formation of a mature self. 
Although Stiegler states that “we must organically reform the Bildung” 
(2010, 35), he continuously refers to the Enlightenment tradition as well as 
to the Platonic understanding of education to capture what the formation 
is. This has important implications for the possible friction between his 
understanding of formation and the situation to which he wants to apply  it. 
Formation and education are usually understood in terms of the 
relation between teacher and student in which the teacher initiates or 
introduces the student in the ways to arrive at understanding. In terms of 
the idea of formation or Bildung as developed in the Enlightenment, the 
fundamental requirement of coming to maturity is that teachers introduce 
students in the horizon of meaning that constitutes the culture in which 
they live: e.g., the students are introduced to the canonical texts of this 
culture, into the way in which they are read, in the practices that are 
needed for sound scholarship, and so on. Thus formation, in its common 
understanding, presupposes the idea of relatively stable tradition, culture, 
or horizon of meaning within which the young students are introduced 
to such an extent that they can develop their own critical attitude to it; 
and it presupposes the distinction between the mature teacher and the 
immature student. 
It is quite clear that Stiegler remains indebted to this particular sense of 
formation, especially in his usage of the importance of maturity in thinking 
the formation of the self. Not only the example of the Enlightenment as 
developed in Taking Care of Youth and the Generations emphasizes this, 
but also his reference to the work of Donald Winnicott and his use of the 
transitional object throughout What Makes Life Worth Living attests to this: 
the transitional object presupposes to the state of maturity represented 
by the mother who offers the child a transitional object to enter and 
appropriate the culture in which the child will be living. 
However, whereas the Enlightenment situation offers a clear culture 
or horizon of meaning within which the practices of self-formation can 
be trained under the guidance of teachers who know these practices and 
their results, the present-day situation is marked by what is called an 
event – the pharmacological event – and this means that the question of 
education and formation departs from a specific “short-circuiting,” that 
is to say, the question of education can no longer be understood as the 
introduction of children or immature humans in a relatively stable culture 
by mature humans. Rather, if the pharmacological event truly short-
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circuits our horizon of meaning, every education in its common sense is 
deactivated. Strictly speaking, the event makes everyone immature; the event 
turns everyone into a child in relation to the new technologies.12 The 
short-circuiting of the pharmacological event thus deprives our culture 
of a population of mature teachers. Consequently, the demands that the 
pharmacological event imposes on the techniques of self-formation are 
clear: it is required to find a new orientation that cannot use the model of 
a mere transition from childhood to maturity since there is no maturity 
present that could guide it. 
In this sense, the situation in which the pharmacological event places 
us might better be described in terms of Derrida’s account of the aporia 
or the impasse. In fact, in the section entitled “philosophy as teaching” 
(2010, 107-112), Stiegler moves in this direction. As he notes, in reference 
to Plato, the experience of aporia or being perplexed arises in philosophy 
when one “has reached the impasse” (2010, 109), and he connects to the 
famous figure developed in the Symposium in which Socrates describes the 
philosophers as the one who loves wisdom “precisely to the degree that 
it escapes and transcends him” (109), and this leads him to the following 
summary concerning philosophical teaching: 
The predicament – the aporia – of philosophical teaching is, then, to 
mark the difference between the teaching of what would be philosophy 
and the object that can never be the telos of a straightforward 
teaching … but that must become an experiment, indeed a way 
of life: an asceticism, a care, an epimēleia of a specific type (of 
which all Foucault’s techniques of the “self” are instances).  (109).
Although this notion of experiment might indeed offer a counter 
model to the models of education that presuppose maturity, it remains 
to be seen whether it can be found in this dialogue. After all, in the 
Symposium, it is Diotima, the wise woman from Mantinea, who guides 
Socrates toward the truth. Hence, also Socrates’ education presupposes 
12 One might even wonder whether, by identifying this becoming immature with the activities 
   of the programming industries and by continuously invoking moral judgments (of especially 
   the French Channel Y to which he continuously refers), Stiegler does not present an ontological 
   problem too strongly in moral or ethical categories: after all, the becoming immature is the 
   immediate consequence of the pharmacological event as he thinks it.
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maturity.13 Nevertheless, despite this inadequacy of the Platonic model of 
philosophical teaching, the idea of experiment might be more beneficial: 
the techniques of self-formation can only be set up as an experiment that 
aims to traverse the experience of the pharmacological event, i.e., that aims 
to become experienced in a situation in which there are neither teachers nor 
maturities. This, one might say, is characteristic of the novelty introduced 
by the event: it goes hand in hand with a lack of experience, and if there is 
a task for the technologies of the self, it is to become experienced in what
the event brought about.14 
Therefore, the distinction between maturity and immaturity does not 
apply to this situation. Stiegler’s judgment of the programming industries 
that they make us immature, ultimately depends on a sense of maturity 
that cannot be thought if one considers the consequences of the event. 
Stiegler’s description (2010: 1-6) of the adult and the adult’s responsibility 
as well as of the effacement of adulthood and childhood is symptomatic 
in this respect: it presupposes a sense of responsibility, adulthood, and 
maturity, and seems to forget that the technological disorientation places 
our society for the task to experiment and find forms of responsibility, 
adulthood and maturity. In such a situation, the objectives of the techniques 
of self-formation are similarly changed: they are important as techniques 
to transform oneself but as techniques that respond to an event, they have 
no clear goal or trajectory since all maturity is lacking. 
Looking back on Stiegler’s basic account of the relation between 
technology and humankind, his insistence on maturity is also problematic. 
The fundamental temporal deferral characterizing all technics implies that 
we are never in the event, experiencing the event as such, but we are always 
relating to it as always already happened, i.e., in its après-coup as Stiegler 
likes to call it, by a “return through the failure of experience” (1998, 186).15 
Humans begin with a failure of experience and therefore need to become 
experienced. The way in which Stiegler stages the problems in his more 
recent works tends to bracket these original insights: when literateness 
and maturity are presupposed – and this is what Kant, Mendelssohn and the 
Enlightenment do: they address the literate public – and when technology 
is thought as the event that interrupts these dimensions of Bildung, it is as if 
13 Stiegler’s reference to Diotima here as the representative of non-philosophy does not take 
   away this problem: Diotima is the wise woman who already knows and who therefore can 
   guide Socrates in the first place; as Socrates says in the Symposium: “But that’s why I came to 
    you, Diotima, as I just said. I knew I needed a teacher” (207c; Cooper, 1997, 490). 
14 See Romano (1999, 193-201) who elaborates this in terms of a hermeneutics of Dasein.
15 See also Romano (1999, 63-69).
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humanity is not marked by an original disorientation. Yet, experienceand 
orientation are not presupposed; they rater depart from the gift and the 
invention of technology. 
3. Conclusion: Experience and Event 
Let us briefly reconsider the course of the arguments developed 
above. Technics or technology, as Stiegler notes from the beginning of his 
work in the first volume of Technics and Time, is what grants human beings 
their capacities so that they can dwell in the world. From the outset of this
human relation to technics, as Stiegler insists, these capacities cannot be 
had without their intrinsic danger: they may ultimately incapacitate the 
human being: technics is a pharmakon for humankind. Yet, the question of 
present-day technology, its accelerated speed and its radical disorientation 
seems to bring into play the incapacitating effect intrinsic to the pharmakon 
stronger than ever. The lack of adulthood, responsibility, maturity, critical 
thinking, and so on, are due to the pharmacological event that short-circuits 
the ways we have at our disposal to live with technology. Yet, as I have 
asked above, is the reference to the classical models of education, which 
underlie Stiegler’s usage of notions such as adulthood, responsibility and 
maturity, not highly problematic in relation to his account of technics as 
pharmakon? These classical models presuppose what is not given according 
to the interpretation of technics in terms of supplement and pharmakon: 
namely a pre-given maturity of humankind. Without a doubt, Stiegler 
would agree with this latter point and would say that this is exactly his 
point, but he seems to forget that, though thinking tradition in terms of 
technics and tertiary retentions, the pharmacological event short-circuits 
tradition as the realm from which we derive the norms of adulthood, 
maturity and critical thought. By insisting on notions such as maturity 
to grasp education and self-formation, he reiterates distinctions such as 
maturity versus immaturity and good versus bad technology that the 
notion of pharmakon aims to dismantle. 
Rather than this reference to maturity, one might perhaps consider 
another concept that does not refer back to (relatively) stable norms 
of adulthood, responsibility and maturity but that rather argues that 
maturity as well as formation should be thought in terms of experiments 
and becoming experienced. Romano, who rethinks phenomenology and 
hermeneutics in light of the concept of the event, explains experience as 
the traversal of dangers and risks (1999, 193-201).  One gains experience 
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when one is confronted with what one does not know, with what one does 
not expect; one gains experience when one is exposed to something new 
with which one does not have any experience yet.16 The encounter with 
an event, with something utterly new, indeed implies that one is exposed 
to it. Such an encounter is both a test and an ordeal (épreuve). Experience 
understood as the human encounter with an event, as the traversal of 
its tests, ordeals and dangers, offers a more accurate account of how the 
event itself is at stake in the self-formation that takes place in experience. 
Rather than distinguishing the pharmacological event of technology from 
the techniques of self-formation that remedy the harms done by the event, 
one should opt for a conception of these techniques that remains much 
closer to their pharmacological nature. The techniques of self-formation 
responding to the pharmacological event are perhaps nothing other 
than the experiencing of this event in its aftermath. Experience itself, as 
the traversal of dangers and the passing of tests, has the character of a 
pharmakon: whereas it is the only possibility to become experienced, i.e., 
to become mature in relation to what is experienced and thus to gain 
capacities to deal with it, it is also the risk of being fully incapacitated: one 
may fail the test and the dangers may prove to be too much. One should 
not forget, in this context, that the techniques of self-formation developed 
in Stoicism and to which both Foucault and Stiegler return in their inquiry 
of the care of the self, were in the first place techniques by which the self 
was putting itself to the test. In its intrinsic relation to technology, humans 
are put to the test by the pharmacological event and, with no pre- or “long-
established” forms of adulthood at their disposal that they might imitate, 
they are first confronted with the test and the task to become experienced 
in the perilous, new situation. 
Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Radboud University, The Netherlands
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